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Whether a court must suppress evidence typically
turns on the conduct or observations of the police officer
who discovered the evidence. By falsely testifying to the
facts surrounding the discovery of the evidence, a police
officer may validate a blatantly unconstitutional search.
New York courts have long recognized that police officers
sometimes fabricate suppression testimony to meet con-
stitutional restrictions.1 Indeed, the Appellate Division
has rejected police testimony at suppression hearings
where the officer’s testimony appears to have been
“patently tailored to nullify constitutional objections.”2
Although, to be sure, rejections are rare and their number
appears to be declining, the appellate courts’ ability to so
rule has not changed. This article will explore the various
circumstances under which the Appellate Division has
discredited police testimony at suppression hearings.
General Principles of Credibility
The Court of Appeals has held that, at a suppression
hearing, the prosecution has the burden to go forward to
show the legality of the police conduct—to show “that the
search was made pursuant to a valid warrant, consent,
incident to a lawful arrest or . . . that no search at all
occurred . . .”3 To meet this burden, the prosecution must
present evidence that is credible.
The determination of a witness’s credibility is pri-
marily for the hearing court.5 That court has the “peculiar
advantages of having seen and heard the witnesses”6 and
is therefore “in a superior position with respect to [credi-
bility] than an appellate court[,] which reviews but the
printed record.”7 Accordingly, an appellate court must
afford “much weight” to a hearing court’s credibility
determinations.8
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals has noted that the
Appellate Division may “effectively curtail the alleged
abuses” of false testimony by overturning a hearing
court’s credibility findings.9 Indeed, deference to a hear-
ing court must yield, and the Appellate Division will
deem testimony incredible as a matter of law, when the
hearing court’s fact findings are “manifestly erroneous or
so plainly unjustified by the evidence that the interests of
justice necessitate their nullification”10 or where the testi-
mony “has all appearances of having been patently tai-
lored to nullify constitutional objections.”11 In making this
determination, the Appellate Division must employ
“common sense and common knowledge”12 and review
the totality of the circumstances.13
The Appellate Division has ruled that testimony is
impossible of belief when, even if uncontradicted, it is
“manifestly untrue, physically impossible, contrary to
experience, or self-contradictory.”14 Each of these four
grounds has spawned its own line of cases. 
Specific Theories for Discrediting Police
Testimony 
A. “Manifestly Untrue”
The first of the categories, testimony that is “mani-
festly untrue,” is the broadest and is perhaps best viewed
as a catch-all ground for discrediting police testimony
that does not fall within another ground. The Appellate
Division has held testimony to be “manifestly untrue”
where an officer testified to, but could not substantiate,
reliance on third-party information or where an officer’s
testimony was belied by other evidence. 
In several cases, the Appellate Division found inade-
quate support for an officer’s claim to have received
information supportive of intrusive conduct.15 For exam-
ple, the Appellate Division discredited an officer’s testi-
mony that he had arrived at the arrest scene in response
to a radio run, given that no tape of the communication
could be located.16 Similarly, the court determined that the
police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant
where, although the stop had allegedly been predicated
on a radio run, the officer who had been instructed to
send the radio run could not remember having done so,
the defendant’s subpoena of the radio run revealed noth-
ing, and the prosecution failed to bolster the existence of
the radio run with testimony from the complainant.17 The
Appellate Division also disbelieved testimony that an
officer, while pursuing a suspect to whom the officer had
allegedly been alerted by a “kid in the street,” had dis-
covered contraband in plain view.18
Contradiction of an officer’s testimony with other evi-
dence has also regularly supported suppression. The
Appellate Division determined in one case that a photo-
graph and disinterested defense witnesses cumulatively
discredited an officer’s testimony that he had seen a bulge
in the defendant’s shirt.19 Likewise, in another case, “other,
more credible evidence at the hearing” belied an officer’s
testimony that he had seen the outline of a gun in the
defendant’s pocket.20 Also rejected was an officer’s attempt
to justify a search based on his alleged observation of a
bulge in the defendant’s shorts and the defendant’s
attempt to flee, where these claims were contradicted by
evidence that the defendant had worn baggy jeans and had
been cooperative.21 Finally, the Appellate Division discred-
ited an officer based on discrepancies between his testimo-
ny about the radio run of a robbery pursuant to which he
stopped the defendant and the actual Sprint reports of the
transmissions regarding the robbery.22
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B. “Physically Impossible”
Testimony falls within the category of “physically
impossible” when it describes an observation or conduct
that defies human abilities. Most of the cases within this
category involve the scope of an officer’s powers of obser-
vation. The Appellate Division has held incredible, for
example, officers’ claims to have observed small objects
from large distances, such as: 
• “a 2-inch glass vial with a dark top, from a distance of
approximately 74 feet, from a moving patrol car, after
dark”;23
• a two-inch crack vial from a sharp angle and from at
least 200 feet away, through binoculars, at dusk;24
• a waistband bulge, from approximately 50 feet away
and while in a taxi at 11:00 P.M.;25 and
• a small burlap bag, the size of a “bank bag,” which
was behind the driver’s seat in a car, while looking
through the driver’s window.26
The Appellate Division, however, has accepted testi-
mony that an officer could observe a person “passing a
white glassine envelope of heroin to a buyer from a dis-
tance of approximately 75 feet on a clear[,] sunny day
with nothing obstructing [the officer’s] view”;27 ”a two-
inch long holster clip in defendant’s waistband from a dis-
tance of about 23 feet while driving along a four-lane
street even though defendant was wearing several layers
of loose[-]hanging winter clothing”;28 and, from 30 to 40
feet away, a defendant deliver to another a clear, plastic
bag containing white powder.29
The Appellate Division disbelieved testimony that an
officer could see from a public sidewalk the lack of tax
stamps on individual cigarette packs “in cartons and
encased in unopened boxes in the back of an unlighted
garage” or make “a similar observation through a con-
venient tear in a carton in an open bag as [the officer]
passed the defendant on the street some two to four feet
from him.”30 The Appellate Division also rejected testimo-
ny that, at 1:20 A.M., as another vehicle passed by, an offi-
cer noted that the driver of that vehicle appeared to be
under the legal driving age.31
The “physically impossible” test is not limited to the
scope of possible observations by the police. Indeed, the
alleged conduct of a defendant may be “physically impos-
sible” as well. For example, the Appellate Division has
discredited testimony that a defendant reached under a
couch to obtain a gun although his hands were cuffed
behind his back.32
C. “Contrary to Experience”
Testimony is “contrary to experience” when it
describes human conduct—by either the police or the
defendant—that is so empirically unlikely as to be unwor-
thy of belief. In this regard, police claims that they acted on
radio communications that a suspect was armed have been
rejected in light of evidence that the officers did not have
their guns drawn upon their approach of the suspect.33
Similarly, the Appellate Division rejected an officer’s asser-
tion that he feared that the defendant was armed because
of allegedly furtive movements given that the officer “did
not communicate his observation to his sergeant, crossed
in front of the defendant’s potential line of fire, . . . did not
direct the defendant to freeze,” and did not arrest or hand-
cuff the defendant at the scene of the stop.34 An officer’s
decision to take a dinner break before having back-up offi-
cers arrest the defendant, whom the officer had allegedly
seen sell drugs, contributed to the court’s rejection of his
testimony as contrary to experience.35
The alleged behavior of the defendant may also con-
tradict experience. The Appellate Division has refused to
credit testimony that a defendant has engaged in behavior
that “only a moron would have committed . . .”36 More
specifically, appellate courts have discredited assertions
that a defendant: 
• threw away narcotics in sight of an approaching
police officer; 37
• left “a cake of marijuana with some strands sticking
out” on the front of a car illegally parked on a main
street; 38
• exited his vehicle and left the driver’s door open with
a loaded gun visible on the front seat although aware
that he was under surveillance;39
• left a scale and tinfoil packets containing powder in
plain view prior to voluntarily admitting at least three
police officers into apartment; 40
• reached for his waistband as the arresting officer
approached in the face of a large-scale show of police
force; 41
• consented to a search of an apartment in which a sub-
stantial amount of cocaine had been stored in plain
view;42
• said “[l]et’s get out of here” to a fully secured arrestee
and, later, threw himself on the floor during a chase;43
and
• left an open box, protruding from his shirt pocket,
envelopes containing white powder.44
The Appellate Division will not discredit police testi-
mony that describes behavior by a defendant that is mere-
ly surprising or unusual. Indeed, the court has accepted
testimony that a defendant, in plain view of uniformed
officers, withdrew a loaded gun and placed it in a box on
top of an ice machine outside of a store into which he
entered;45 opened her purse and displayed to another, in
plain view, a clear bag containing white powder while
seven to 30 feet from the police;46 held out his open hand
and offered another a small envelope containing vials of
cocaine while an officer approached from behind in the
vicinity of Port Authority bus terminal;47 held out a bag
and stated that “it was just marijuana” after the police
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stopped his car for his erratic driving;48 and “sponta-
neously turned and placed himself up against the wall,”
assuming a frisk position, after being asked by the police
whether he lived in the building and answering that he
did not.49
D. “Self-Contradictory” 
In several cases, the Appellate Division has rejected
police testimony on the ground that it was “self-contra-
dictory”—that the testimony was contravened by other
statements of the same witness. An officer who testified
regarding his observation of drugs inside a box was
fatally impeached with his own “incident report,” which
contained a different version of the officer’s observation
with respect to the box.50
Disparities between an officer’s testimony and prior
statements regarding the content of an informant’s accu-
sation, and between his testimony and his statements at
an interview regarding the recovery of a weapon, likewise
led the Appellate Division to reject his testimony.51 The
Appellate Division also rejected testimony where there
were inconsistencies between the officer’s hearing and
grand jury testimony regarding the relayed description of
the defendant and where the officer had failed to record
in his memo book or arrest report the supposed receipt of
information from witnesses at the scene of arrest.52
Notably, not merely self-contradiction, but inconsistencies
between the testimony of different officers, has also led to
suppression. For example, the prosecution did not meet
its initial burden to go forward with credible evidence
where the testimony of its three police witnesses “dis-
close[d] confusion, contradictions, uncertainty and con-
flicting versions of what took place,” including on the key
question of whether the search preceded or followed the
arrest.53 The Appellate Division also discredited police tes-
timony where one testifying officer not only contradicted
himself in many regards but was contradicted by the
other testifying officer on the questions of why the officers
had, for a time, followed but not stopped the defendant’s
car and which officer had removed a bag containing nar-
cotics from the glove compartment.54
Conclusion
It is an unfortunate but well-recognized fact that, to
justify their conduct, police officers sometimes falsely tes-
tify about their observations, the information upon which
they acted, or the conduct of the defendant.55 An officer’s
testimony at a suppression hearing is “patently tailored to
nullify constitutional objections”56 and therefore incredi-
ble as a matter of law when it is “manifestly untrue,
physically impossible, contrary to experience, or self-
contradictory.”57 In such circumstances, the prosecution
has failed to meet its burden to present credible evidence
to validate the police conduct and the court must suppress
the evidence in issue. When a trial court refuses to do so,58
appellate courts must be asked to step in.59 
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